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26 MARCH 1970

SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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# SURVEY

## *of Communist Propaganda*

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26 MARCH 1970  
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CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

## C O N T E N T S

### EAST-WEST RELATIONS

USSR Attacks U.S. Weapons Plans, Affirms "Seriousness" on SALT . . . . 1

### THE NEAR EAST

Moscow Warns of Coup Plots After Assassination in Cyprus . . . . . 3  
PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA Accuse "Far Right Extremists," NATO

### SOUTH ASIA

Peking Encourages Armed Guerrilla Movements in India . . . . . 7  
Peking Sustains Attacks on Indian "Revisionist" Lines  
CPI, CPI/M Take Cautious Stand on Pro-Peking Extremists

Peking Hardens Line on "Ruling Clique Headed by Indira Ghandi" . . . . 11  
PRC Remains Intransigent on Sino-Indian Relations

### THE USSR

Proponents of Mechanized Links Renew Their Offensive . . . . . 13  
Publicity for Link System of Farming Increases  
Link Spokesmen Lobby at Agricultural Conferences

Pressure for Ministerial Reform Continues to Build . . . . . 16  
Ministries Urged to Reduce Administrative Overhead  
Production Associations Attract Wide-Ranging Support  
Press Support for Leningrad's Production Associations

Drug Addiction Apparently a Growing Problem in Georgia . . . . . 20

Ukrainian Theaters Charged with Ideological Errors . . . . . 21

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 1 -

## EAST-WEST RELATIONS

USSR ATTACKS U.S. WEAPONS PLANS, AFFIRMS "SERIOUSNESS" ON SALT

Moscow propaganda continues routinely to attack U.S. plans for moving forward with deployment of the Safeguard ABM system and MIRV's as an escalation of the arms race and to warn that deployment may adversely affect the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) opening in Vienna on 16 April. At the same time, it reaffirms Soviet "seriousness" toward the talks and urges Washington to follow suit. In this vein, PRAVDA commentator Vishnevskiy on 20 March says that the "international public has repeatedly noted the USSR's goodwill and constructive approach" to SALT; he concludes that the other side's goodwill is also required for the negotiations to be successful. And a commentary by Fedorov for North American listeners on the same day, drawing on the 7 March PRAVDA Observer article, says that the USSR approaches the upcoming talks "with the most serious intentions" and hopes that the United States will display the same attitude.

The Fedorov commentary, in registering displeasure over the Administration's decision on ABM's and MIRV's, suggests the possibility of Soviet countermeasures. In his words, it is understandable for the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to feel a "need to respond to measures of this kind, being concerned about their security. Whatever the Soviet Union has done to build up its defense potential is a response to the frenzied nuclear and missile race in the United States." A foreign-language commentary by Glazunov on the 17th had similarly threatened counteraction, noting that the USSR "must draw conclusions and take measures corresponding to the true state of affairs."

Propaganda remains characteristically silent on the nature of the proposals likely to be presented by the Soviet delegation at Vienna. TASS and the domestic service have, however, taken note of the resolution approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 20th urging the United States and the Soviet Union to seek to negotiate at SALT a freeze on offensive and defensive missiles. Moscow has not been heard to report President Nixon's 21 March press conference remarks on SALT, in which he indicated that such a goal is "what SALT is all about." Moscow has also ignored the President's observation, at the same press conference, that the Soviet negotiators at the Helsinki phase of the talks "did not come in with generalized language, . . . but they came in with very precise weapon systems, by weapons systems analysis."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 2 -

#### LINKAGE CONCEPT REJECTED

Moscow has long been on record as rejecting the notion that progress at SALT should be linked to other areas of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. While the linkage question has not been prominent in comment in recent months, two articles currently touch upon it. Writing in IZVESTIYA on 18 March, commentator Sagatelyan takes note of the fact that a Washington POST article has interpreted "published and unpublished statements by Washington leaders" to mean that if the Soviet Union is interested in the success of the Vienna talks, "it ought to take into account the fact that this success depends on what changes will take place in the USSR's position concerning the Near East problem . . . and the war in Vietnam." Sagatelyan asks if this is an attempt to "dictate conditions" to Moscow, and concludes that such tactics have not succeeded in the past and will not work now. An article in RED STAR the following day by Col. Leontyev charges former New York TIMES observer Hanson Baldwin with trying to "buy and sell peace" with his suggestion that progress at SALT be dependent on Soviet concessions--among others, the cessation of aid to the Vietnamese and the Arabs and the tearing down of the Berlin wall.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 3 -

## THE NEAR EAST

MOSCOW WARNS OF COUP PLOTS AFTER ASSASSINATION IN CYPRUS

In the wake of the authorized TASS statement of 17 February charging NATO, Greek, and local "reactionary" forces with plotting against Cyprus' independence, Moscow seems to have been slow to make propaganda capital out of the attempted assassination of President Makarios on 8 March. In the week following the release of the TASS statement, broadcast attention to Cyprus was a relatively low one and a half percent of total comment; this figure dropped markedly in the following week, rising again with publicity for the 12th congress of the Cyprus communist party, AKEL. In the week after the attempted assassination, Moscow devoted almost four percent of total comment to Cyprus, but this consisted largely of publicity for Podgornyy's message to Makarios condemning the attempt on his life by "forces of reaction."

TASS on the 8th promptly reported the attempt, attributing it to "fascist terrorist elements" and going on to recount an emergency resolution adopted by AKEL that day, the concluding day of the party congress, which expressed indignation at the action by "fascist agents of imperialism." Broadcasts in Greek and Turkish to Cyprus on the 9th, as well as a foreign-language commentary by Vavilov that day, followed established lines in underscoring the strategic importance of Cyprus in view of Middle East tension, and routinely accused NATO and its "agents" of efforts to bring Cyprus into NATO and turn the island into its place d'armes in the region. The propaganda also insisted that the "imperialists," alarmed at the possibility of a successful conclusion of the intercommunal talks, are intensifying their "secret subversive activity" against the republic. A KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article on the 11th stopped short of accusing the rightist National Front of responsibility for the assassination attempt but denounced the activities of its members, claiming they were in the pay of the imperialists and were acting on their orders to effect enosis, establish a military dictatorship on the island, and subject Cyprus to "NATO enslavement."

## YIORKATZIS ASSASSINATION

The assassination on 15 March of former Cypriot interior and defense minister Yiorkatzis, which further clouded Cyprus' political scene, was at first virtually ignored by Moscow. TASS on the 16th briefly reported the assassination, and on the 17th noted an AKEL statement

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

briefly condemning the action. A commentary in Greek and Turkish to Cyprus on the 18th gingerly observed that Yiorkatzis had been killed "by persons so far unknown," and that "many aspects of this crime are still unknown." It then turned to stereotyped accusations against "NATO imperialist circles backing the terrorists" and strongly supported the intercommunal talks as the "only right line" for normalizing the Cyprus situation and strengthening the island's independence. Similarly, a broadcast the next day to Yugoslavia cautiously declared that until the results of the investigation were made public, "we will not venture to guess which particular imperialist agency in Cyprus was the direct organizer of these crimes." It is clear, the broadcast added, that the recent events are part of a "broader imperialist conspiracy" against Cyprus' independence. It cited British press speculation on the authors of the Yiorkatzis assassination, and seemingly tried to dissociate Yiorkatzis himself from involvement with alleged machinations of the combined reactionary-Greek-imperialist forces, asserting that he favored preserving Cyprus' independence while the National Front seeks enosis, and claiming that such "extremist elements" are "being linked" with the presence in Cyprus of "a number of reactionary Greek army officers."

Prior to his assassination, Yiorkatzis had been characterized in the weekly NEW TIMES (Russian edition 12 March) as an "antigovernment element" and was said to have been "closely associated with the CIA and Greek Colonel Ladas." Ladas in turn, according to NEW TIMES, is regarded by Greek Premier Papadhopoulos "as a dangerous rival because of his close connections with American intelligence agencies." NEW TIMES viewed the CIA, Ladas, and National Front leaders as "links in the same chain," and said this was where one should look for the organizers of the attempted assassination of Makarios.

#### SOVIET REPRESENTATIONS

An effort to exploit the situation seems to have been initiated on 19 March when the Soviet ambassadors in Cyprus and Turkey called on President Makarios and Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil, according to Nicosia and Ankara radios, respectively; on the 20th Nicosia reported that Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis had received the Soviet ambassador to Athens. Moscow has made no public reference to these meetings, but the activity was explained by AKEL organ KHARAVYI on the 21st: The Soviet Government, it said, "has made identical representations to the three guarantor powers of the Zurich-London agreements, demanding absolute respect for the independence of Cyprus and the avoidance of any action which could worsen the situation on the island." It is believed, KHARAVYI added, that the Soviet Union "once again reiterated that it is not going to remain indifferent to actions for the overthrow of President Makarios and the dissolution of the Cyprus state."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 5 -

KHARAVYI said it was not known whether the USSR delivered relevant notes to the three governments, but if it had, "their content should become known in the next few days." The representations were made through calls by the Soviet ambassadors to the foreign ministers of Greece, Britain, and Turkey, while the ambassador in Cyprus also met with Makarios. KHARAVYI recalled that "the previous Tolubeyev-Makarios meeting, approximately one month ago," was followed by the TASS statement warning of "conspiratorial plans against Cyprus." In a Moscow-dated report on the 25th, KHARAVYI said "diplomatic sources" there had confirmed that the Soviet Government "in the past few days" made "strong representations" to the governments of Britain, Turkey, Greece, and the United States, again stressing that the USSR "vigilantly watches the criminal conspiracies against Cyprus."

(In the wake of these Soviet representations, Athens has made attempts to present the Soviets as responsible for Turkish warnings against a possible coup in Cyprus. Foreign Minister Caglayangil, prior to his meeting with the Soviet ambassador, was reported by Ankara radio on the 19th as having said that efforts to achieve enosis "through fait accomplis will find themselves facing Turkey with all its might and potential." Athens radio on the 21st quoted the Athens paper ELEVTEROS KOSMOS as calling "unfounded" Ankara allegations of an imminent coup in Cyprus to achieve enosis. The paper added that "a few days ago the Soviet Government fired fireworks of a similar nature." On the 23d, citing ATHENS NEWS AGENCY reports from "reliable Nicosia sources," Athens radio said the Turkish Cypriot leadership had assured the Greek Cypriots that Turkey had softened Caglayangil's statement after being informed that Soviet reports to the Turkish Government of an impending attempt to assassinate Makarios, mount a coup d'etat, and declare enosis, were fabricated reports "aimed at serving Soviet interests.")

PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA Accuse "Far Right Extremists," NATO

The first apparent propaganda charges of a plot to carry out a coup in Cyprus are made in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA articles of the 20th.\* In IZVESTIYA's morning edition that day Matveyev declares that the "conspirators" aim to execute a coup in Cyprus in the "interests of the far right extremist forces" who aspire to "set up their own dictatorship" and make Cyprus an appendage of NATO in the eastern Mediterranean. He makes the usual plea for closure of foreign bases in Cyprus, declaring that now that Britain is withdrawing "East of Suez," the British bases in Cyprus should also be liquidated. (The

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\* The IZVESTIYA article has been carried only in a broadcast to Yugoslavia, while the PRAVDA article has been broadcast to Greece and Turkey, and in both Greek and Turkish to Cyprus.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY

26 MARCH 1970

- 6 -

stereotyped demands for elimination of the British bases generally do not include mention of U.S. operations on the island, but a broadcast in Greek to Cyprus on the 13th did call for abolition of foreign military bases and "espionage and sabotage centers.")

Matveyev proceeds to build a case for mainland Greek involvement in the events in Cyprus, citing the London DAILY TELEGRAPH to the effect that Greek officers serving in Cyprus are directly assisting the National Front and may even be members of that organization, and pointing to recent "inflammatory speeches" by former EOKA leader Grivas. NATO, of course, is the ultimate culprit, with the threads of the "conspiratorial activity" running from Athens to NATO headquarters and "the appropriate departments in certain Western capitals."

Reiterating standard Soviet views on Cyprus, Matveyev employs a mild variant of the old propaganda formula that the USSR cannot remain indifferent to events in the proximity of its frontiers, a formula that seems to have become fashionable again recently in comment on the Middle East and Mediterranean. The situation in this part of the Mediterranean, he says, which is not far from the frontiers of the Soviet Union and the socialist states of southeastern Europe, "cannot fail to attract our attention." He warns that those who are "preparing plans for liquidating the state of Cyprus and overthrowing its legal government" are assuming heavy responsibility for the possible consequences of such actions. Employing the language of past Security Council resolutions calling for avoidance of actions infringing on the legal rights and interests of Cyprus, he emphasizes that enosis "or anything similar which encroaches on the position of Cyprus" cannot be a basis for any sort of settlement.

The PRAVDA article, by the paper's regular Greece and Cyprus commentator, Bragin, similarly charges that the attempted assassination of Makarios was aimed at a coup d'etat and establishment of a military dictatorship which would eliminate Cyprus' independence. Dealing with the Yiorkatzis murder, Bragin cites "Cypriot papers" as noting that he was assassinated "to prevent the unraveling of the threads of the conspiracy being woven across the ocean and in Athens." Another aspect of the assassination, Bragin claims, is that "certain NATO circles" want to use Yiorkatzis' murder "to reinforce their interference in Cyprus' internal affairs." Bragin strongly implies a NATO hand in Yiorkatzis' death, remarking that the Western press has many suggestions as to the assailants but conceals the question of who was behind them. There is good reason for this, he says, since "the NATO military is bending over backward to free itself of responsibility for the crimes committed by their agents on the territory of a sovereign state." Like Matveyev, he calls into question the role of the National Front--adding the charge that its members "have long been in the service of the CIA--as well as involvement by the "Greek military dictators."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 7 -

## SOUTH ASIA

PEKING ENCOURAGES ARMED GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN INDIA

Since mid-1967 Peking has provided propaganda support for armed insurrectionary movements in India and has sustained an unremitting polemical campaign against the two established Indian communist parties for having betrayed the cause of armed revolution in favor of "revisionist" peaceful tactics.\*

Chinese media have carried periodic accounts of the development of the peasant armed struggles in India and have provided generous publicity for the new, pro-Maoist Communist Party of India/Marxist-Leninist (CPI/M-L), particularly through disseminating articles from the CPI/M-L's monthly theoretical journal LIBERATION. A PEOPLE'S DAILY end-of-the-year account of the Indian peasant movement, carried by NCNA on 18 January, claimed that 1969 witnessed "a vigorous development of the revolutionary armed struggle of the Indian peasants and a steady expansion and growth of their armed forces."

Recalling that the first shot of armed struggle was fired under the leadership of "the revolutionaries of the Indian Communist Party" by the peasants in Naxalbari of Darjeeling District, West Bengal State, in March 1967, the article noted that after its founding on 22 April 1969 (Peking ignored the fact that this was Lenin's birth date), the CPI/M-L assumed the leadership of the peasant armed guerrilla struggles and during the remainder of 1969 made "great progress" in dealing "increasingly heavy blows at the reactionary Indian ruling classes" throughout India. PEOPLE'S DAILY proclaimed that the CPI/M-L has begun to advance armed struggle "to a completely new stage--the stage of seizing political power and establishing guerrilla bases." It documented this claim by noting--as have subsequent NCNA reports--that in Srikakulam

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\* Peking's support for Indian insurrectionary movements and its break with the Communist Party of India/Marxist are discussed in the FBIS SURVEYS of 7 July 1967, page 24, and 31 August 1967, page 4.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY

26 MARCH 1970

- 8 -

(in northeast Andhra Pradesh) the peasants had established "people's political power," created "people's courts to try the enemy of the people," and secured base areas of armed struggle in 300 villages into which officials of the Indian Government cannot enter and in which "the reactionary state apparatus has ceased to function."

A 14 March NCNA article demonstrates that Peking distinguishes between the Indian peasants' revolutionary armed struggle led by the CPI/M-L and "the armed struggle of the Mizo and Naga people for national liberation." Peking has displayed a closer affinity with the movement led by the CPI/M-L, providing it with the preponderance of propaganda support and claiming that it is following "the road of Naxalbari" and has spread its struggle to nine states of India. The Chinese also encourage the Mizo and Naga movements, confined to mountainous regions in East India, by offering periodic accounts of successful attacks of the Mizo and Naga armed forces on the "reactionary armed troops and police, dealing heavy blows to the reactionary government." Peking does not link the Mizo and Naga movements with the communist-led peasant struggle, and only rarely mentions the CPI/M-L in commentaries dealing with the Mizos and Nagas.

#### Peking Sustains Attacks on Indian "Revisionist" Lines

The Chinese propaganda ballyhoo for alleged successes of the CPI/M-L's Maoist strategy of armed peasant guerrilla struggle contrasts with its polemical campaign against the heresies and difficulties of the two established communist parties in India--the traditionally pro-Soviet Communist Party of India (CPI) and the formerly Peking-oriented Communist Party of India/Marxist (CPI/M). Peking denounces these "traitorous revisionists" for advocating the "parliamentary road" to power and for participating in coalition governments.\*

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\* Both the CPI and the CPI/M were until recently participants in united front governments in the states of Kerala and West Bengal. A CPI-led coalition replaced the CPI/M-dominated government of Kerala in November 1969, and President's rule was imposed on West Bengal on 19 March 1970 following the fall of the united front government in that state, in which the CPI/M was the major component.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 9 -

The "excellent situation of the Indian people's armed revolution," NCNA claimed on 6 January, had been created after "frustrating the capitulationist revisionist line" of "such as Namboodiripad [CPI/M] and his ilk and the Dange [CPI] renegade clique" who advocate the "parliamentary road." NCNA noted that after "rigging up 'united front' governments" in Kerala and West Bengal as "sinister models for 'peaceful transition,'" the "Indian revisionists" themselves directed troops and police in "the slaughter" of the revolutionary workers and peasants, thus proving to the people that the "'parliamentary road' is impassable, absolutely impassable." "Revisionist" CPI/M leader Jyoti Basu, deputy chief minister in charge of the police in the recently-fallen West Bengal united front government, was singled out in a 14 March NCNA commentary which charged him with issuing an order to "'shoot to kill' the peasants and revolutionaries."

In a similar vein NCNA on 7 February reported a LIBERATION article's claim that the success of the revolutionary movement led by the CPI/M-L has discredited "the revisionist leadership of the party" which had maintained that "the Thought of Chairman Mao Tse-tung is unsuitable for India, that armed struggle cannot be waged in India, and that advocating armed struggle leads to the destruction of people's fighting organizations." NCNA on 21 March viewed the collapse of the West Bengal united front government as still further "proof of the bankruptcy of the line of 'peaceful transition' energetically advertised by the Indian revisionists," and it claimed that increasing numbers of peasants in West Bengal "have spurned the 'parliamentary road' of the Indian revisionists and, under the leadership of the CPI/M-L, have kindled the flames of armed struggle in many rural areas in the state."

#### CPI, CPI/M Take Cautious Stand on Pro-Peking Extremists

The propaganda organs of the CPI and the CPI/M reflect both parties' dilemma as participants in united front governments--associated on the one hand with governments that take action against the extremists, which could lay them open to charges of participating in the repression of revolutionaries, while on the other hand seeking recruits and supporters among leftist elements of the population. Also, as in Andhra Pradesh, there is a fear that governmental suppression of the extremists is apt to extend to fringe elements of the CPI and the CPI/M and may potentially compromise their "parliamentary road to power" through the ballot box. Both parties have thus sought to walk a tightrope, castigating the police officials for excessive suppression and the revolutionary leaders for excessive extremism.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 10 -

While viewing the fortunes of the peasant guerrilla movement as currently on the wane, the two parties' organs express concern that, on the pretext of suppressing the revolutionary movements, state government officials are committing unnecessary atrocities. The CPI's weekly publication NEW AGE carried articles in its 4 January, 18 January, and 1 March issues calling for cessation of the police manhunts against the "Communist Revolutionaries and Naxalites" (both the CPI and the CPI/M avoid referring by name to the Communist Party of India/Marxist-Leninist). CPI General Secretary Rao noted in the 4 January issue that even though the "extremist movement of the Naxalites as well as the Communist Revolutionaries have received a setback and are on the wane in Andhra Pradesh," and that all of the top leadership of the coordination committee of communist revolutionaries have been arrested, atrocities continue to be committed "by the armed police on the people in the name of suppressing the Naxalites in the areas declared disturbed by the state government in Andhra Pradesh." Rao said that these atrocities have become "unbearable" and called for an immediate cessation.

The Andhra Pradesh state council of the CPI, in a report submitted on 2 January and reviewed by NEW AGE on 18 January, coupled a demand for an end to police atrocities with an appeal to the Naxalite leaders to abandon their "present form of struggle" because it was being utilized "by the landlords, moneylenders, and the government to suppress democratic movement and adding untold miseries to the people." NEW AGE reported on 1 March that the CPI state council in Andhra Pradesh has established a 40-member legal defense committee for political prisoners in that state, and that it has demanded the withdrawal of all cases including the conspiracy case against T.N. Reddy (an extremist Naxalite leader who has recently been attempting to form a new--fourth--communist party in India).

In recent months the CPI/M weekly organ PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY has avoided the subject of the Naxalites, a lone exception being a brief reference in a long letter--published in the 1 February issue--from the CPI/M to the Prime Minister. Accusing the Andhra Pradesh government of resorting to "most heinous and barbarous methods of liquidating scores of Naxalite activists," the letter warned that such repression is "only gladdening the hearts of the oppressive landlords and rapacious money-lenders, while causing indignation among the common people."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 11 -

PEKING HARDENS LINE ON "RULING CLIQUE HEADED BY INDIRA GANDHI"

Expectations of potential improvement in Sino-Indian relations in the near future appear dimmed in view of a recent hardening of Peking's long-standing effort to discredit the domestic and foreign policies of the Indian national government, as evidenced by the appearance of personal attacks on Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.\* The strongest language to date is contained in an 18 March NCNA review of a LIBERATION article which denounces "the ruling clique headed by Indira Gandhi" and depicts her as a U.S. and Soviet pawn pursuing "basically the same anti-national anti-China policies as her father."

A sharpening in the derogatory personal references to the Prime Minister began with a 24 December NCNA review of a December LIBERATION article by Charu Mazumdar, leader of the CPI/M-L, which--in contrast to Peking's prior impersonal denunciation of the "reactionary Indian Government"--referred to "the reactionary Indian Government headed by Indira Gandhi."\*\* Peking used the latter terminology in attacking Gandhi personally in its own name in an 18 January PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary on the Indian peasant armed struggle, and repeated the phrase in a 14 February NCNA item. Still another term--"the ruling clique of India"--appeared in an 8 March NCNA review of another Mazumdar LIBERATION article; NCNA itself attacked the "Indian ruling clique" on 12 March. The latest stage in this transition was the aforementioned 18 March NCNA review of LIBERATION which castigated "the ruling clique headed by Indira Gandhi." The Prime Minister is still spared the more derogatory term of "fascist chieftain," which Peking uses to describe the leaders of Indonesia and Malaysia, though the trend has been in that direction.

PRC Remains Intransigent on Sino-Indian Relations

Consonant with the hardening line on the Prime Minister, Peking's disparagements of Indian appeals for improved relations and its indictments of the Indian Government for allegedly colluding with China's neighbors reflect an intransigent stance on Sino-Indian relations and continuing concern over PRC border security.

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\* Peking's treatment of Gandhi at the time of the split in the Indian Congress Party in late 1969 is discussed in the FBIS SURVEY of 20 November 1969, page 7.

\*\* Peking commentaries in June and September 1968 identified Gandhi as "Prime Minister of the reactionary Indian Government."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 12 -

Peking charges that the Indian leaders are following a dual approach-- talking about better Sino-Indian relations while engaging in anti-China activities such as aiding Tibetan rebels, colluding with Chiang Kai-shek in the creation of "two Chinas," and undertaking hostile military preparations. For example, NCNA on 5 February accused the Indian leaders of paying "lip service to the 'improvement of relations with China'" while using "the Tibetan traitor bandits to carry out frantic anti-China activities," thus demonstrating India's "stubbornly hostile stand" toward China. Similar NCNA commentaries on 16 and 24 March charged the Indian Government with "frenziedly interfering in China's internal affairs" by again "aiding and abetting the Tibetan renegade bandits" in an attempt "to realize its [India's] expansionist ambition toward China's Tibet." NCNA on the 24th warned that the Indian Government cannot harm China either by aiding the Tibetan rebels or "by coming forward itself to attack China frenziedly."

Continuing concern over the border situation was reflected in the 6 March NCNA claim that the Indian Government is promulgating "the lie of the so-called 'double threat' from China and Pakistan" and that India has stepped up military preparations in recent years along the Indian borders with China and Pakistan. Specifically, NCNA claimed that the Indian Government has deployed "large numbers of troops" and has "stepped up the building of fortifications, airstrips, highways, and railways" in the areas bordering on China and Pakistan, and that the planes and trucks of the Indian army rear services "have been transporting day and night" on the western section of the Sino-Indian border. It accused India of ignoring the independence and sovereignty of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim in its strategy "for the seventies" of insuring that India "remains the dominant power south of the Himalayan crests."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 13 -

## THE USSR

PROponents OF MECHANIZED LINKS RENEW THEIR OFFENSIVE

Advocates of the "unregulated" link system of farming are now exerting renewed pressure for the introduction of the controversial innovation on a wider scale. Since the beginning of the year there has been a marked upsurge in favorable publicity for mechanized links in the central press, highlighted by the initiation of a new series of articles in SOVIET RUSSIA under the rubric "Unregulated Links: Experience and Prospects." The promotional campaign in the press has been accompanied by intensive lobbying by link spokesmen at recent agricultural conferences in Moscow.

The current drive to expand the link system continues to be sparked by the leadership of the Russian republic--Politburo member Voronov's power base--which went on record last year in favor of the innovation. Support has been forthcoming from other influential quarters as well, however, as evidenced by the endorsements of the link system by two members of Brezhnev's political entourage, Kazakh First Secretary D.A. Kunayev and Komsomol First Secretary Ye. M. Tyazhelnikov, at their respective republic and Komsomol plenums last December. Tyazhelnikov and his Komsomol associate, V.T. Duvakin, were also listed among the notables attending a 16 March Moscow conference of link "enthusiasts" which was addressed by Voronov.

Publicity for Link System of Farming Increases

Agitation for the link system of farming began to pick up in the central press following the criticisms of economic shortcomings at the December CPSU plenum. A series of "Letters from Vologda" by S. Ilarionov in SOVIET RUSSIA on 20, 21, and 22 January revealed the dissatisfaction of local farm leaders with the traditional farm wage system and the growing appeal of the "unregulated" link system of wages--a system geared to the end results of production rather than to the fulfillment of differentiated work norms. The positive achievements of mechanized links in the RSFSR, Belorussia, and the Ukraine were also singled out in articles appearing in ECONOMIC GAZETTE on 19 January, RURAL LIFE on 27 and 29 January, and SOVIET RUSSIA on 21 January.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 14 -

The momentum of the press campaign was accelerated with the initiation on 12 February of a new series of articles on the link system in SOVIET RUSSIA. In introducing the new series, the editors emphasized the national dimensions of the link movement by declaring that the development of mechanized links was a byproduct of scientific-technological progress, not an outgrowth of "the natural or economic peculiarities of a given area." The link system, they asserted, gave "real" promise of realizing the goal of "more output with less expenditure of labor and resources."

The articles in the SOVIET RUSSIA series (12, 19, and 26 February, 5 and 12 March) have thus far been clearly promotional in nature. They have uniformly stressed the striking gains in peasant productivity and income and the corresponding economies in production resulting from the introduction of mechanized links in various parts of the RSFSR. In addition, they have stressed the beneficial impact of the link system on peasant attitudes toward work. In the only exception to this line of commentary, the 5 March SOVIET RUSSIA article complained about bureaucratic opposition to the link system by officials in two RSFSR wine trusts. The officials were said to have banned a mechanized link experiment in a Dagestan vineyard kolkhoz in clear disregard of the decision of the RSFSR Council of Ministers last March and of the successful results of the experiment. This complaint was reiterated in a 17 March SOVIET RUSSIA editorial which praised the accomplishments of the link system.

The positive themes expounded in SOVIET RUSSIA were echoed in other papers. A 14 February KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article reported that mechanized links had produced high yields of cotton in Tashkent oblast last year, despite the bad weather conditions and the general underfulfillment of the oblast's annual plan. Writing in a similar vein in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 19 February, two officials from Chelyabinsk oblast expressed enthusiasm over the potentialities of the link system and the prospects for its "broad introduction" in the area.

These potentialities were also highlighted in a sociological study of peasant attitudes reported in LITERARY GAZETTE No. 10 on 4 March. The study concerned the attitudes of peasants on three sovkhoses in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 15 -

Kazakhstan, only one of which had been converted to the link system--the much publicized and highly controversial farm managed by Ivan Khudenko.\* Nearly all the peasants on Khudenko's farm, which had a minuscule staff of only two administrators and a total labor force of 60 persons, were found to be genuinely satisfied with their working conditions, actively participating in the farm's decision-making, and rarely involved in social conflicts. This situation contrasted sharply with that in the other two farms, where dissatisfaction, apathy, and social tension were said to prevail.

The authors of the LITERARY GAZETTE report also cited statistics on productivity, income, and costs which illustrated the overwhelming superiority of Khudenko's farm as an economic enterprise. On the basis of the economic and sociological findings, the conclusion was drawn that the link system provided an effective means of increasing the efficiency of production and generating positive attitudes toward work among the peasantry.

#### Link Spokesmen Lobby at Agricultural Conferences

The public relations campaign was accompanied by active lobbying by link spokesmen at a series of agricultural conferences. On 16 February, at the first conference of representatives of the newly formed councils of kolkhozes in the RSFSR, Voronov's associate K.G. Pysin, First Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, called attention to the exemplary achievements of mechanized links in the RSFSR and to the responsibilities of agricultural agencies and farm leaders in promoting the innovation. He advised the councils to examine the work of mechanized links and prepare recommendations for their "more active" introduction in 1970.

The lobbying on behalf of the link system continued at two agricultural conferences in March. On 16 March Voronov addressed a Moscow meeting of link "enthusiasts" organized by the editors of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. According to the cryptic report in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 17 March, the meeting was attended by pioneers in the link movement and officials from the RSFSR and the Ukraine. Also participating in the meeting were representatives of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and the State Committee on Questions of Labor and Wages of the USSR Council of Ministers--two institutions which were criticized in 1967 for opposition to the link system (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 20 May 1967).

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\* For background, see FBIS SURVEY for 19 June 1969, pp. 10-14.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 16 -

On the following day another meeting on the system of wages used in mechanized links was convened in Moscow under the auspices of the RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute for the Organization and Payment of Labor in Agriculture. Curiously, the only announcement of this meeting appeared in the 17 March SOVIET RUSSIA editorial which had praised the link system and had called attention to the persistence of bureaucratic opposition to it. On 18 March SOVIET RUSSIA--again the only central paper to cover the meeting--reported that the meeting was addressed by the director of the research institute V.A. Tikhonov, the economist M. Ye. Klyuyev, and the Volgograd agricultural administrator I.P. Shabunin. Both Tikhonov and Shabunin have gained prominence as spokesmen for the link system.

#### PRESSURE FOR MINISTERIAL REFORM CONTINUES TO BUILD

Criticisms of economic leadership at the December Central Committee plenum and in the subsequent campaign for increased efficiency have intensified pressure on ministries to reform their structural organization. Most proposals for ministerial reorganization involve eliminating the administrative units between the ministry and the individual enterprise, replacing them with territorial production associations. This shift from the branch principle of administration toward the former territorial principle as embodied in sovnarkhozes is being led by the Leningrad and Baltic leaders, who only reluctantly gave up the sovnarkhozes in 1965.

Opposition to reducing ministerial power and changing the structure remains strong, however, and the December plenum failed to endorse the production associations. Apparently, the plenum limited itself to demanding elimination of unnecessary echelons in economic administration, further development of the economic reform, and an end to ministerial violation of reform principles. As Lithuanian Premier Manyushis said in the 14 February IZVESTIYA, there still is no "unified opinion about the form of subordination of a production association," and some want to retain main administrations and limit production associations to the role of an "enlarged enterprise."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 17 -

Ministries Urged to Reduce Administrative Overhead

Top-level pressure for improvement in the ministerial structure began with a 13 October decree by the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers calling for cutting back administrative staffs of ministries, enterprises, and organizations, in order to reduce administrative expenses by 1.7 billion rubles in 1970 (PRAVDA, 24 October). In early December the RSFSR Council of Ministers issued a similar decree, which additionally ordered a specific review of the need for trusts, combines, and administrations, and urged combining of small enterprises where "advisable" to reduce administrative staffs (SOVIET RUSSIA, 9 December). The 15 December Central Committee plenum criticized the "many excess organs" in administration and pressed ministries to improve their administrative methods, according to the 13 January PRAVDA editorial.

Last November, the People's Control Committee was ordered to concentrate on checking on administrative apparatus expenses and to make proposals to reduce staffs and simplify administrative structure.\* The Georgian People's Control Committee has completed its study of Georgian ministerial structure, and the Georgian Council of Ministers adopted the committee's proposals to eliminate various administrative subdivisions and join together many small enterprises (PRAVDA, 26 February).

USSR Coal Industry Minister B. F. Bratchenko announced in the 15 February SOCIALIST INDUSTRY that his ministry had reorganized to eliminate most trusts, many combines, and other echelons. In the 12 March PRAVDA, P. Kovanov reported that the Ministry of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises had eliminated 16 trusts and associations, 141 construction administrations, and other organs. Nevertheless, Kovanov complained, ministries still are doing little to improve their structure.

Production Associations Attract Wide-ranging Support

Concrete proposals for reorganization center on extending the economic reform to the ministries' main administration, or going a step further to eliminate the main administrations and

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\* According to a statement by P. Kovanov, chairman of the People's Control Committee, in PRAVDA, 12 March. See also last November's decree of the People's Control Committee in SOCIALIST INDUSTRY, 21 November.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 18 -

replace them with production associations operating on reform principles. The first of these was advocated by Leningrad association director G.A. Kulagin in the December OKTYABR and by liberal economist A. Birman in the 11 February LITERARY GAZETTE, the second by Kulagin in the 9 January SOCIALIST INDUSTRY, by Lithuanian Premier Manyushis in the 14 February IZVESTIYA, and by People's Control Committee inspector S. Rudzit in the 17 February SOCIALIST INDUSTRY.

The Baltic and Leningrad leaders have been the most closely associated with these proposals and have already moved in this direction in their own areas. Estonian Premier Klauson, an advocate of simplified administrative structure, stated that Estonia had eliminated intermediate links between the ministerial level and the enterprises several years ago (SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 20 December). Lithuanian Premier Manyushis advocated a ministry-association-enterprise structure for national ministries in his 14 February IZVESTIYA article. Economist Birman, also a backer of the Leningrad production associations, cited Latvia as an example for organizing industry on the plant-ministry basis (NOVY MIR, December 1969).

The strongest and most consistent pressure for ministerial reform has come from the Leningrad leaders, who have long been critical of the ministries in Moscow\* and have lately accelerated their agitation on behalf of production associations. Leningrad First Secretary Tolstikov, one of the eight speakers at the December plenum, presumably reiterated there his well-known support of associations. G.A. Kulagin, director of one of Leningrad's leading production associations, in the December issue of OKTYABR complained of backsliding in regard to the economic reform and insisted that the reform be extended to central ministerial organs. He recalled that the September 1965 plenum had "directly pointed out the need to transfer main administrations to financial autonomy." Kulagin repeated his views in the 9 January SOCIALIST INDUSTRY, noting pressure by some officials to repeal some of the reform provisions and attacking ministerial obstruction. Criticizing ministries' main administrations as abstract, purely administrative organs uninterested in economic results, he urged their replacement with production associations as the main link between plant and ministry. He advocated putting operational leadership in the production associations and reducing the role of Gosplan and central ministries to long-range and branch-wide policy and planning.

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\* See FBIS SURVEY for 27 February, 8 May and 22 May 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 19 -

Two post-plenum Leningrad meetings--a January oblast aktiv meeting (PRAVDA, 8 January) and a February obkom plenum (SOVIET RUSSIA, 25 February)--have been used as forums to urge expansion of production associations and attack continuing ministerial opposition to production associations. Leningrad trade union chief B.A. Popov utilized his speech at the late January All-Union Central Trade Union Council plenum (TRUD, 29 January) to promote the advantages of production associations, calling them "the most efficient path of further development of the economy." G.V. Romanov, Leningrad obkom second secretary and Yu. I. Zavarukhin, gorkom second secretary, strongly promoted Leningrad's system in February issues of KOMMUNIST (No. 3) and PARTY LIFE (No. 5) respectively.

#### Press Support for Leningrad's Production Associations

Leningrad's production associations have received increasing press support since the post-plenum efficiency campaign began in early January. A dozen articles and editorials have specifically praised Leningrad's work (editorials in the 16 January SOVIET RUSSIA, the 28 January PRAVDA, PARTY LIFE No. 3, ECONOMIC GAZETTE No. 5, the 18 February PRAVDA, and the 24 February IZVESTIYA, and articles in ECONOMIC GAZETTE No. 5, the 7 and 9 February PRAVDA, 13 February SOVIET RUSSIA, 14 February IZVESTIYA, and 17 February SOCIALIST INDUSTRY). Other items such as a 9 January PRAVDA editorial and an editorial in KOMMUNIST No. 2 have proposed the creation of more production associations without referring to Leningrad specifically.

A 13 February SOVIET RUSSIA article by I. Karev and S. Yegorov--entitled "Leningraders Show the Way"--attacked ministries and Gosplan for ignoring Leningrad's work. An editorial in ECONOMIC GAZETTE No. 5 and Zavarukhin's article in PARTY LIFE No. 5 asserted that the Central Committee had approved the Leningrad obkom's work in establishing production associations. There has, however, been no public announcement to this effect, and thus it is uncertain how specific the Central Committee's approval was.

The People's Control Committee, charged with the responsibility for proposing changes in ministerial structure, also appears to favor associations. Chairman Kovanov advocated a ministry-association-enterprise structure for the chemical industry, metallurgy, and construction ministries, and he approved the joining together of small enterprises (PRAVDA, 12 March). Committee inspector S. Rudzit complained that a check by his organization had revealed that some machine-building ministries had no plans to create any associations and that ministries had liquidated many successful associations (SOCIALIST INDUSTRY, 17 February).

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 20 -

One of the main attractions of production associations, in the eyes of local authorities, is that their creation would strip central ministries of operational control of local industry and return control to the localities--in effect, a partial reversion to Khrushchev's sovnarkhozes. Lithuanian Premier Manyushis, in a 14 February IZVESTIYA article, advocated replacing main administrations with production associations and argued the need to relieve ministries of the burden of supervising local enterprises. Territorial production associations, he explained, "could combine branch and territorial planning, which is very important for improving planning and comprehensive development of the economy of union republics and economic regions." In the December NOVY MIR Birman also argued the need for more territorial, as against branch, organization, and he cited the advantages of the sovnarkhozes.

#### DRUG ADDICTION APPARENTLY A GROWING PROBLEM IN GEORGIA

Traffic in drugs and drug addiction appear increasingly to be matters of concern to the leadership of the Georgian SSR. Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze has spoken out twice on the issue in recent months.

At a Georgian Komsomol congress in late February Mzhavanadze admitted that a crackdown instigated in mid-1969 has not yet proved effective. Although "many young people, including four Komsomol members," have been sentenced for drug addiction and the sale of narcotics since the issuance of a Georgian decree on 30 June 1969, Mzhavanadze said, "we are still apparently conducting insufficient work in this direction." He concluded that "we must declare a most implacable war on this evil" (ZARYA VOSTOKA, 1 March).

Mzhavanadze also referred to the problem during a Georgian Central Committee plenum in December 1969. There he declared that "we must struggle more boldly and resolutely against cases of hooliganism, drunkenness, drug addiction, and all antisocial phenomena" (ZARYA VOSTOKA, 13 December).

The results of six months' application of the June 1969 decree, which stiffened earlier penalties against addicts and peddlers, were discussed by the Georgian Supreme Court in January 1970 (ZARYA VOSTOKA, 14 January). The court's first deputy chairman reported that the courts had "noticeably intensified the struggle against addiction in the second half of 1969."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS SURVEY  
26 MARCH 1970

- 21 -

UKRAINIAN THEATERS CHARGED WITH IDEOLOGICAL ERRORS

A December meeting of the party members of the Ukrainian culture ministry on raising the ideological militancy of communists in theaters and other cultural institutions has resulted in a crackdown on Ukrainian theaters by local party leaders in several oblasts.

The meeting, reported in the 12 December RADYANSKA UKRAINA, attacked some theaters for failing to aid the party in political education of the workers, and it called on the Donetsk, Sumy, Kirovograd, Chernigov and Rovno obkoms to take action in regard to their local theaters. RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 27 February reported the responses by the ideological leaders of these oblasts. The Sumy obkom fired the director of the theater criticized and announced measures to "raise the ideological-artistic level of productions." Kirovograd obkom secretary N. Sukharevska acknowledged shortcomings in that oblast's culture administration and its theater and announced a revision of its repertory and a strengthening of work with young dramatists. The Rovno ideology secretary also announced revisions in the local theater repertory, including addition of a play depicting the prewar local struggle to "reunite" the west Ukraine with the USSR.

Hardest hit was Donetsk oblast. Its oblast culture administration chief was attacked by name at the December meeting for letting a Donetsk theater flounder. The theater's director and chief artistic director have now been fired and a new artistic council appointed. Donetsk has had other ideological problems recently. A 6 January obkom plenum on ideological education of scientific-engineering intelligentsia found serious shortcomings in this work and fired the head of the obkom's science and educational institutions section (Donetsk radio, 7 January).

CONFIDENTIAL